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Despite variations in institutional and political settings,
comparative political research is consistent in pointing to
executives as the main drivers of national agendas in
parliamentary systems. After presenting a new dataset coding
the policy content of investiture speeches of appointed Italian
Prime Ministers between 1979 and 2014, this article offers a
new strategy to test the “partisan hypothesis”, i.e., the
relationship between ideology and the issue composition of
executives’ policy agendas. By comparing each pair of Italian
governments’ programmatic speeches through multivariate
analyses, we show that the ideological distance of
governments is a good predictor for agenda divergence in a
multiparty-coalition political system.
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1
Introduction
The formation of policy agendas, defined as “the list of subjects
or problems to which society pays serious attention at any given
time” (Kingdon 1984, 3), is one of the most consequential states
of the policy process. Without paying attention to a problem,
there can be no policy change or, using Schattschneider’s words,
“the definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of
power” (1960, 68). Political elites are faced with an abundance
of information regarding the state of the world, and these
“problems” must compete for the limited space on the political
agenda. This information needs to be processed and prioritized
before any action can take place. Due to awareness of the
critical importance of agenda-setting dynamics, a rich tradition
of studies has provided accounts for why certain issues are
prioritized and discussed on the political agenda, whereas others
are neglected (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cobb and Elder
1983; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Kingdon 1984). These
works have inspired a relatively recent wave of agenda-setting
studies sharing a similar methodological approach, the
Comparative Agendas Project [CAP;
www.comparativeagendas.net] (Borghetto and Carammia 2010;
Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014).
While the flow of attention of attention can be inspected
along the whole policy process and through the eyes of different
political actors, the preponderance of executives in national
policy-making makes the study of cabinet agendas an ideal
starting point. Despite variations in institutional and political
settings, comparative political research is consistent in pointing
to executives as the primary drivers of national agendas in
parliamentary systems (Rasch and Tsebelis 2013).1 Several works
1 Executive dominance has been enhanced over the years by two
parallel processes. On the one side, the expansion of state functions and the
parallel increase of bureaucratic apparatuses has expanded the need for
greater coordination and governance in an increasingly broad range of
policy areas (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015). On the other hand, the
growing shift of decision-making powers to regional and international
organizations has enhanced the role of executive representatives who have
a seat in these institutions, vis-à-vis parliamentary institutions, which are
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have investigated the agendas of executives through the prism of
agenda-setting studies (Breeman et al. 2009; Dowding et al.
2010; Jennings, Bevan, and John 2011a; Jennings and John
2010; Mortensen et al. 2011). Most of them found little
evidence for the supposition that government turnover and
changes in ideology do account for major alterations in
executive programmatic profiles. Rather, cabinet agendas tend
to exhibit a remarkable degree of stability, punctuated only
occasionally by sudden shifts of attention, mostly associated
with responses to pressing public problems (e.g., Mortensen et al.
2011). These findings take issue with a large body of literature
which, on the contrary, has stressed the importance of
governments’ ideological positions on policy priorities (for a
review, see Imbeau et al. 2001). Parties will try to attach their
name to a specific core of policy priorities and positions to
appeal to their partisan constituencies and, when entering a
government coalition, they will try to have them incorporated in
executive programmatic declarations. As a result, the executive
agendas of left-leaning coalitions should differ from those of
right-leaning coalitions. Ultimately, it is what parties do in
office that helps them to consolidate their ownership of selected
issues.
Although these studies have done much to further our
understanding of how executives allocate attention, evidence on
the impact of partisanship remains mixed. This article aims to
contribute to the debate by providing a new test of the two
competing hypotheses on the relationship between party
ideology and executive agendas presented above (in line with
Baumgartner et al. 2009b, we refer to them as the partisan
differentiation and the partisan neutrality hypotheses).
Specifically, for each pair of cabinets in our dataset, we test the
association between their ideological distance and divergences in
the content of their agendas. We interpret a positive and
statistically significant association as evidence that partisan
ideology does matter for agenda content.
We conduct our analysis using multivariate regression
analysis and control for a series of government-specific and
speech-specific attributes. The study covers 27 Italian
governments, starting in 1979 at the inauguration of the eighth
legislature, and ending in 2014 with Renzi’s speech during the
still more active on the national dimension (Moravcsik 1994).
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17th parliamentary term. Data on party ideology and executive
agendas are derived from the content coding of investiture
debates preceding the vote of confidence. This is indisputably
one of the constitutive moments in the life of an Italian cabinet.
It is the occasion at which a cabinet's policy goals and legislative
agenda for the next five years are presented or, in the case of
government turnover, for the remainder of the legislative term.
As a result, we argue that it represents a suitable setting for
studying the relationship between party ideology and executive
agenda in Italy. Data on party ideological positions were
retrieved from the Italian Legislative Speech Dataset (Curini
2011, Curini and Martelli 2009). This data set has the advantage
of providing estimates of party positions that vary not only
across legislatures, but also within each one of them. Data on
the policy content of executive agendas were obtained by coding
the policy content of programmatic speeches delivered by the
appointed Italian Prime Ministers (PM) before receiving the vote
of confidence. Each sentence or quasi-sentence of a speech was
coded into one of the 239 issue areas, before being aggregated
into one of the 21 major areas composing the Italian CAP
codebook. The main asset of this topic coding lies in its level of
granularity. Executive agendas can be relatively complex and
heterogeneous policy documents, so we need finer lenses to track
their evolution through time.
The article begins by framing the hypotheses mentioned
above in the literature and by describing our research design.
Then, we present an overview of Italian executive formation and
agenda-setting and its evolution from the First to the Second
Republics. Next, we give a descriptive account of our dependent
variable, executive agendas. This is followed by a formal test of
the two hypotheses. We end with a discussion of the results.
2
Government ideology and executive agendas
The goal of this article is to analyse the relationship between
governments’ ideological position and the policy content of
executive programmatic speeches. Prime Ministers’ investment
speeches have been extensively used in the literature as a proxy
for the policy agenda of a government (see infra). As a direct
measure of cabinets’ policy priorities, they do not pose the
dilemma related to the aggregation of coalition partners’
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interests. Unlike electoral manifestos, they also have the
advantage of measuring the agenda not only for the whole
legislature, but for each new executive, allowing for variation
within each legislative term. Moreover, compared to other direct
measures of policy agenda like executive budget speeches, they
impose fewer constraints and are more easily visible to the
general public, and “therefore represent a much more likely case
for identifying effects of partisan colour and electoral mandate”
(Mortensen et al. 2011, 7).
The sizeable research literature on this topic can be organized
around two opposing views (e.g., Baumgartner et al. 2009b,
John et al. 2014). On one side, the partisan differentiation
hypothesis states that party identity matters for agenda-setting.
There are general attributes of left- and right-wing ideology
that influence which issues a party prioritizes and focuses on
while in government. Such issues are historically associated with
those parties and cannot be downplayed because they are judged
necessary by both their advocates and their voters (see Budge
2015 for a detailed literature review). Periodically, parties have
to refresh this “ownership” in the mind of the electorate. An
excellent opportunity to do so is by showing commitment to
these issues while in office. For instance, left-wing governments
are expected to spend relatively more on welfare, and right-
wing governments on defence (e.g., Soroka and Wlezien 2010).
This article is not concerned with the impact of ideology on
policy outputs and spending patterns, but on executive priorities.
Even so, the relevance of agenda-setting decisions should not be
understated, because the first step to getting executives to act on
specific issues is to include them in the executive programme. In
summary, the partisan differentiation hypothesis expects the
ideological composition of a government coalition to be
associated with the content of the executive programme.
The partisan neutrality hypothesis challenges the relevance of
partisan influences on executive programmes. Executives are
primarily problem-solving institutions in charge of responding
to a constantly changing external environment (Jones &
Baumgartner 1995). Their agenda must adapt to pressing
domestic and international problems facing the whole nation, no
matter the composition of their party. Secondly, the PM and
ministers are individuals with their own preferences and vision
(Baumgartner et al. 2009a). This implies that they may be
willing to attach their name to specific policies, even though they
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are not an integral part of the core ideology of their party.
Finally, executive agendas are inherently stable because of old
problems inherited from previous governments (Rose 1990), and
because executives can anticipate the need to reach compromises
with non-partisan actors such as interest groups and
bureaucrats in the course of the mandate and to decide to
incorporate some of their priorities in the programme from the
very beginning.
Previous works investigating executives’ agendas
(Baumgartner et al. 2009b; Breeman et al. 2009; Dowding et al.
2010; Jennings, Bevan, and John 2011a; Jennings and John
2010; John et al. 2014; Jones and Baumgartner 2005;
Mortensen et al. 2011) found mixed evidence that changes in the
partisan control of governments account for major alterations in
executive programmatic profiles. Rather, cabinet agendas tend
to exhibit a remarkable degree of stability. They only
occasionally witness sudden shifts of attention, mostly in
reaction to pressing public problems (e.g., Mortensen et al.
2011). Among the countries investigated - Australia, Denmark,
France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United
States - only the analysis of the UK case lent support to the
partisan differentiation hypothesis (Jennings et al. 2011b; John
and Jennings 2010; Mortensen et al. 2011). All other studies
showed that partisan changes in government do not
systematically affect the level of year-to-year stability in
government agendas.
These works have significantly contributed to our
comparative knowledge of executive agenda dynamics. On the
other hand, their strategy of testing partisan influence is mostly
based on either measures of year-to-year correlation
(Baumgartner et al. 2009b; Breeman et al. 2009), issue stability
(Mortensen et al. 2011) or binary variables measuring election
years or partisan shifts in government (John and Jennings 2010;
Jennings et al. 2011b; Mortensen et al. 2011). First, using a
year-to-year measure of stability only allows for a comparison
of the sequence of governments. Secondly, a binary variable
measuring government turnover fails to capture party shifts on
the policy spectrum. In this article, we test the two competing
hypotheses, adopting a different strategy for each. For each pair
of cabinets, regardless of their temporal sequence, we verify the
association between their distance on the left-right dimension
and the thematic divergence in their agendas. A positive and
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statistically significant association should be taken as evidence of
the partisan differentiation hypothesis. A null or negative
association lends support to the partisan neutrality hypothesis.
3
Setting executive agendas in Italy
Given their prominence, there is no shortage of works
analysing investiture speeches in Italy. Some focused on their
rhetoric content (Bolasco 1996; Di Benedetto 2009; Fedel 1998).
Others coded the policy content of investiture debates to infer
the policy positions of the cabinet and parties in parliament
(Curini 2011; Curini and Martelli 2009; Ieraci 2008).2 Finally,
others parsed investiture speeches searching for specific political
commitments (Villone and Zuliani 1996). To date (and to our
knowledge), only the latter study has systematically analysed the
evolution of government agendas in Italy over time. Villone and
colleagues analysed programmatic speeches from the first (1948)
to the 11th (1994) legislature by coding each sentence expressing
a policy commitment according to one of 21 policy sectors (or
69 sub-sectors, or 137 sub-sub-sectors). They also classified
each policy commitment based on its specificity (see Guagnano
1996, 94–106). By computing the number of commitments in
the speech addressing each policy area, they found evidence that
the cabinet agenda gradually expanded in scope in the first 11
Italian legislatures (1948-1994). As expected, each topic
exhibited a specific trend: some either increased or decreased
monotonically, while others fluctuated between periods of high
and low attention. Overall, their analysis revealed that the logic
underlying the evolution of attention is more issue-specific than
system-determined. After dividing Italy’s pre-1992 history into
four intervals (according to the type of governing coalition
supporting the cabinet), they show that none of these periods
exhibit remarkably distinct patterns in the distribution of
2 For instance, Curini and Martelli (2009) and Curini (2011) analysed
the content of all investiture speeches going from 1946 to 1994 in order to
derive, using an adapted version of the Comparative Manifesto Project, the
two most relevant policy dimensions characterizing the Italian political
space and the relative position of each party/coalition over time. These
data were used, among other things, to shed new light on the analytical
narratives of the formation and dissolution of governments for the whole
First Republic period.
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attention.
More than 20 years have passed since the comprehensive
work edited by Villone and Zuliani and, in the meantime, the
Italian political system has undergone a profound
transformation. As no party has ever managed to command an
absolute majority in both chambers, most post-war Italian
cabinets have had to rely on formalized coalitions. What has
changed in the last decades has been the process of coalition
formation. Under the old proportional electoral system, parties
did not need to coalesce before elections. Each party ran
individual campaigns and, based on its proportional share of
votes and coalition potential, it could negotiate its position in
government. The pivotal party in the process of government
formation was always the Christian Democracy (DC) Party, the
relative majority party, since the other major political force, the
Communist Party (PC), was systematically deemed to be an
unacceptable coalition partner due to its alleged “anti-system”
profile. Smaller parties on the centre-left and centre-right had
no alternative but to grant or deny their support to DC-led
coalitions, largely based on political opportunity. The executive
agenda outlined in investiture speeches represented more of a
platform for discussion than a pre-agreed list of priorities tying
the parliamentary majority to the cabinet. It set out a template
for party bargaining, which was already underway during the
debate following the PM’s speech, when each party had the
chance to publicly stress its policy position on specific agenda
items (Russo 2015). It is worth noting that important policy
decisions were not usually the outcome of intra-cabinet
meetings. Italian ministers answered by and large to their party
representatives (to whom they owed their positions), rather than
to the PM.3 Talks took place mostly in meetings between party
chairs and the PM, the so-called vertici. When divisions
emerged and could not be overcome, governmental crises were
one of the accepted instruments for the renegotiation of the
terms of the coalition agreement without calling for new
elections. These resulted in a cabinet reshuffle and a new vote of
investiture.
Since 1994, the process of government formation and the
3 As aptly described by Hine, the Italian chief executive “is at most a
political formula, and his main task is to negotiate agreement on the
detailed legislative implementation of that formula between the factions and
parties of which it is composed” (1993, p. 200).
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standing of the PM inside the government has changed
significantly. First, the majoritarian prize in single districts
envisaged by the new electoral law has forced parties to merge
into coalitions which share a programme and a leader before the
elections. Secondly, the simultaneous rise of a new political force
in the centre-right (Berlusconi’s Forza Italia), and a
“normalized” social democratic party on the centre-left, filled
the void left by the implosion of the old party system. The
dynamics of party competition became essentially bipolar,
pitting a centre-right coalition against a centre-left one, so
much so that “their [the coalitions] size, composition and
performance are the most important factors for explaining
electoral outcomes” (Bartolini et al. 2004, p. 2).4 The
combination of these two factors is said to have shortened the
electoral link between voters and executives. On the one hand,
Italian heads of state did not have much choice but to appoint
the leader of the winning coalition as formateur PM, which
indisputably strengthened the PM and made him/her more of a
leader and less of a mediator. On the other hand, coalitions
competed based on alternative pre-electoral platforms, with the
implicit commitment to implement them once in office. A
mandate relationship emerged between voters and the executive,
at least rhetorically, whereby the implementation of the coalition
agenda became more and more important in increasing the
prospect of re-election. In other words, in the new system,
election results are expected to more directly determine not only
who will govern but also the executive agenda (Borghetto et al.
2014; Moury 2013).
4
The evolution of Italian executive agendas, 1979-2014
The analysis that follows relies on a dataset of all of the
investiture speeches delivered at the Chamber of Deputies by
Italian PMs between 1979 and 2014. Investiture ceremonies of
the appointed President of the Council of Ministers date back to
the monarchic era, and include a speech addressed to both
4 The return to a PR system in 2005 did not fundamentally transform
the bipolar structure of the Italian party system due to its strong
disproportional traits. It was the appearance of a new strong anti-
establishment contestant in the 2013 elections, the Five Star Movement,
that ushered Italy into a tripolar system.
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chambers of the Parliament before the new cabinet asks for a
confidence vote.5 Through the decades, investiture speeches have
varied in length and tone, largely reflecting the different
personalities and rhetorical style of Italian PMs. At the same
time, their basic structure has not changed significantly. They
can generally be divided into four distinct parts (Capolupo 1996;
Russo 1984). First, the speeches start with a ceremonial section,
used primarily to evaluate the general political situation and
make references to past events. Depending on whether the
cabinet is the first of the legislature or whether it is following an
early cabinet dissolution, the focus can either be put on the
events of the recent electoral campaign or on how the crisis
within the majority coalition was solved. The second part is
devoted to an overview of perceived societal priorities, most of
the time backed up by data or general references to public
problems left unaddressed by previous governments. This is the
list of issues which, in principle, will work as the political
compass for the new executive. Finally, there is a list of specific
policy objectives to be attained during the legislative mandate
and the intended institutional instruments for their realization.
This section not only directs attention to problems, but also to
solutions. Speeches usually end with a highly symbolic appeal
for collaboration between all the forces of the political hemicycle
for the well-being of the country. Topic coding made use of the
CAP master codebook, partly adapted to take Italian specificities
into account. The coding framework consists of 21 major topics,
each divided into a number of minor topics. These sum up to
239 topics in the Italian codebook.6 This twofold level of coding
specificity represents one of the main assets of these data. It
allows for changes to be tracked in policy attention both at a
general (how much emphasis was accorded to either foreign
policy or labour issues) and at the policy level (two cabinets can
allocate the same amount of attention to environmental issues,
but have different priorities regarding waste disposal and forest
5 The government appointed by the President of the Republic needs a
positive vote of confidence from both Houses before entering into force,
and a lack of confidence in one Chamber is enough to bring it down (Art.
92-94 of the Italian Constitution). From a formal viewpoint, executives are
not accountable for the implementation of the policy programme delineated
in the investiture speech.
6 The Italian codebook is available at the following url:
https://goo.gl/qvbDUA.
Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche / ?.200? 11
and species protection policies). The analysis that follows will
only be run at the major topic level, although the results at the
minor topic level are largely compatible.7 The other advantage of
this dataset is its comparability with other datasets produced by
the Italian CAP team as well as those from other nations (see,
for instance, Borghetto and Carammia 2015). With regard to the
coding process, we first removed all non-relevant parts of the
text, such as titles or interventions by other MPs interrupting the
speech. Secondly, we split all speeches into either sentences or
quasi-sentences, i.e., parts of a sentence mentioning different
minor topics. These are our units of analysis. Thirdly, we coded
through a dummy whether each (quasi-) sentence contained
policy content or was purely ceremonial/rhetorical (for instance,
when it contained accounts of the government formation
process). Following Breeman et al. (2009), the units of text
containing policy content were further divided into: statements
containing general references to a policy problem or goals, e.g.,
“we will support measures to protect occasional workers”, and
statements presenting specific policy actions, e.g., “we will speed
up the approval of the minimum wage reform in parliamentary
committees”. Subsequently, to each quasi-sentence containing
policy content, the coders assigned a major and a minor topic
code. Documents were coded by the authors, who worked in
pairs but assigned codes independently. As coding reliability was
one of the main concerns, the coders discussed each case of
disagreement, and all of the authors made the final decision.
This process progressively contributed to the improvement of
inter-coder reliability, which attained levels of above 0.90 at an
advanced stage of the coding process.
During the 35 years covered by the present research, 28
cabinets took office, with the overall cabinet duration varying
from 100 (Spadolini II in 1982) to 1412 days (Berlusconi II from
2001 to 2004).8 Of these, two were “technocratic” cabinets (Dini
in 1995 and Monti in 2011) featuring ministers and junior
ministers without political affiliations. The time range of the
study allows for a comparison of the speeches delivered during
the last four legislatures of the First Republic (1979-1993) and
all of the speeches of the six subsequent legislatures (1994-2014).
We purposely selected only the tail end of the First Republic,
7 These analyses are available upon request.
8 The “caretaker” Fanfani VI government (1983) did not win the vote of
investiture and was dropped from the analysis.
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because our interest lies in the changes brought about by the
introduction of bipolarism after 1994.9 Comparing legislatures
too far back in time risks introducing too much unobserved
heterogeneity. We went back to 1979 to cover all of the
legislatures in what Calise (2015) labelled “the age of reform” of
Italian executives.10 These years witnessed the adoption of a
range of institutional innovations aimed at strengthening the
legislative power of the executive and the standing of the PM
through a reorganization of the executive office in Palazzo Chigi.
These reforms created the institutional structure which has
remained in force ever since.11 The relative continuity of
institutional parameters allows the effects of alternation in
government to be brought into sharper focus. The rest of this
section is devoted to outlining how general patterns of executive
agenda-setting have changed over the last 35 years. Adopting a
macro perspective - an inevitable choice given space
constraints – comes at the cost of a systematic test of the
impact of factors such as the PM’s communicative style, the type
of cabinet crisis or the impact of external events (e.g., economic
crisis) on the content of PM speeches. This goes beyond the
purview of the present analysis and we leave it to future research.
The intention is rather to bring to light long-term trends in
executive agenda-setting.
We expect the time at which the speeches are delivered, either
at the beginning of the legislature or during the term, to matter
for their attentional profile. First, the longer the time horizon is,
the more ambitious the list of priorities should be. Second, the
prestige of the electoral victory may still loom large during the
so-called “honeymoon” period, thus PMs should normally be
9 For a more detailed account of this period, see Curini and Martelli
(2009).
10 During the 1980s, some attempts were made to make the government
function more cohesively, and to strengthen the role of the PM. For
instance, Giovanni Spadolini established within the Presidency of the
Council a department for the analysis and verification of the government
programme, while Craxi tried to reinforce the steering role of the PM in a
political rather than a diplomatic direction (see also Hine and Finocchi
1991).
11 The only notable reform was passed through Law 50 of the 8 March
1999, passed under the aegis of the then Minister for the Public Function,
Bassanini. It is credited for providing the first organic reorganization of the
Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the structure of the Council of
Ministers and the various Ministers’ offices.
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more ambitious in their policy declarations.
Figure 1 illustrates the change in the number of (quasi-)
sentences in each speech, distinguishing between the share of
rhetoric statements, generic and specific policy proposals. If one
focuses on the total number of sentences, the pattern is rather
erratic. The eighth legislature witnessed by far the longest
speeches on average. Other long speeches are also those
delivered by Andreotti VI (10th legislature), Amato I (11th) and
Prodi II (15th). In contrast with the rest, these speeches also used
a greater share of policy-related sentences. Although more
research is warranted on this point, we may hypothesize that,
given the extremely unruly and fragmented coalitions supporting
these executives, such detailed agendas were seen as a useful tool
to tie the hands of riotous coalition members.12 The shortest
speech preceded the investiture of the third Berlusconi
government (14th legislature). The new cabinet emerged from a
partial reshuffle of ministers orchestrated by Berlusconi to reflect
changes in the internal balance of power of the majority
coalition. With a relatively short time frame left before the end
of the legislature, Berlusconi did not feel compelled to change
the guidelines of his previous agenda. As a final note, Figure 1
shows a clear decreasing trend in specific policy proposals: they
occupied around 60% of quasi-sentences during the 8th
legislature, while this dropped to around 20% in the last two
legislatures. The tendency is for speeches to become shorter and,
12 In the case of Prodi and Amato, their more “technical”
communication style might stem from their common professional
background: they were both university professors (albeit with a rather long
career in politics).
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for the most part, they do not delve into policy details.
Since the speeches vary in length, we analyse their issue
composition as the share of sentences covering an issue, using
the sum of general and specific policy proposals as the
denominator. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of attention
share paid to each policy area in all speeches. To begin with, the
proportion of attention paid to a single topic ranges from a
minimum of 0% to a maximum of 40%. In line with previous
studies (Jennings, Bevan, and John 2011a), we found that a
group of core issues never leaves a cabinet’s agenda:
macroeconomics, justice and crime, foreign policy and state
operations. These issues are strongly associated with the
traditional functions of government and never leave the agenda.
The agenda space for other issues, also referred to as “agenda
diversity”, is largely dependent on how much attention they
capture (e.g., Jennings et al. 2011b). In particular, the share of
references to macroeconomics and state operations stands out.
Fig. 1. Distribution of quasi-sentences by type of content for the twenty-seven
Italian governments.
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Together, they always represent at least 2/5 of the total agenda.
Attention to topics jumping on and off the agenda is distributed
fairly equally. Within this second class of topics, the most
citations were collected by labour and employment, social policy
and defence, and the least by immigration and state property.
Two further measures are available to outline long-term
variations in the policy composition of agendas: agenda scope
and agenda diversity. The former measures the absolute number
of policy issues which are granted at least one mention in a
speech, irrespective of how much space each of them received. A
PM’s speech can be more or less selective. The inclusion of more
issues implies committing the cabinet to act in a larger number
of areas. The concept of agenda diversity is somewhat related
but captures a different dimension of variation: the degree of
fragmentation of the agenda. For instance, out of a number of
issues that make it onto the agenda, a PM can focus most of
their attention on a couple of topics (low diversity) or split their
Fig. 2. Distribution of attention across the twenty-one CAP
policy issues.
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time equally across all of them (high diversity). Studying policy
agendas in terms of diversity is important for two reasons. On
the one hand, given the finite nature of attention, it is
problematic to account for the rise of an issue on the agenda
without considering its interrelationship with the rest of the
issues competing with it. On the other hand, variation in
diversity is indicative of how a political system processes
information and reacts to public signals. In other words, it
reflects to some extent its interest representation system
(Schattschneider 1960).
The measurement of agenda scope is straightforward: we
count the number of major topics mentioned at least once in the
speech. Thus, the score for each speech can vary between 0 and
21, the maximum number of topics in the codebook. Issue
diversity is measured through the normalized Shannon’s H
entropy score (Boydstun, Bevan, and Herschel 2014). This score
varies between 0 and 1, and it increases as the spread of
attention across all issues, using major topics, evens out.13
Assuming that there can be a maximum of10 topics on the
agenda, it will get: a 1 if each subject receives exactly 10% of
the attention, or a 0 if the speech deals with just one topic.
Figure 3 plots the variation of the two scores over time, with the
dashed line indicating the mean value across the legislature. As
anticipated, the patterns emerging from the two graphs look
similar. If we look at the speeches of electoral governments
(circles) and those of parliamentary governments (triangles)
within the same legislature, we can notice an emerging pattern
after the 11th legislature: speeches inaugurating the legislature
tend to touch on a more heterogeneous range of topics and,
excluding the 13th legislature, deal with them more evenly.
These are interesting findings, which call upon the transition
from a pivotal to a competitive party system. With regard to
electoral programmatic speeches, it has been suggested that they
tend to more closely reflect the priorities emphasized in the
coalition programme, which has also become more articulated
13 It is calculated as follows:
Shannon’s H normalised
where xi represents an issue, p(xi) is the proportion of total attention
the issue receives, lnp(xi) is the natural log of the proportion of attention
the issue receives and N is the total number of issues.
Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche / ?.200? 17
(Borghetto and Carammia 2015). What is more, there is greater
pressure on executives to deliver on their promises: now, the
policy record and not just the ideological positioning are
believed to matter for reelection (Capano and Giuliani 2001).
5
The relationship between ideological and agenda divergence
Our competing hypotheses on partisan influence posit that
agenda divergence between the programmatic speeches of two
governments should either increase in line with the ideological
distance of their supporting coalitions (partisan differentiation)
or that there should be no significant relationship between the
two (partisan neutrality).
We measure agenda divergence, our dependent variable, by
using the reverse of the “issue convergence score” developed by
Sigelman and Buell (2004). For each pair of the 27
programmatic speeches (n=351), this index calculates the
absolute differences in attention proportion for each of the 21
issues included.14 The index goes from 0, indicating a perfect
overlap between the two agendas, to 1, when the distribution of
attention diverges completely. For instance, a value of 0.8 means
that 80% of the new agenda is different from that of the other
executive.
The average divergence score is 32.8 with a standard
deviation of 8.2. As expected, the smallest divergence (14)
emerges from the comparison of two agendas temporally near to
one another: Craxi I (1983) and Goria (1987). On the other
hand, the pair of Spadolini I (1981) and D’Alema II (1999)
exhibits the highest divergence (56.1). Both were non-electoral
cabinets, but they assigned opposite weight to foreign policy
(Spadolini devoted a considerable share of his speech to Italy’s
relationship with the allies in the context of the Cold War) and
government administration (D’Alema talked, among other things,
about the reform of the electoral law and the federal reform of
Italian institutions). The goal of our analysis is to test which
14 It is calculated as follows:
Sigelman /Buell Index
where n is the number of possible issue areas and xi is the share of
attention devoted to issue area i respectively at times t0 and t-1 (for a similar
approach, see Carammia et al. 2016).
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factors account for this variability.
Our main independent variable is the ideological divergence
between governing coalitions on the Left-Right scale. Data on
party positions, computed by Curini and Martelli (2009) and
Curini (2011), use the speeches delivered by each party
representative during the parliamentary debate immediately
following the PM’s programmatic speech. Based on an analysis
of the policy content of the speeches, these authors reconstruct
the evolution of the Italian policy space in the First Republic and
they show that it “fits studies of post-war Italian political
history” (Curini 2011, 118). These estimates of policy positions
serve our analysis needs perfectly because they allow the
variation in party policy preferences to be tracked between
elections, and not just across elections, as in the case of left-
right party positions estimated through party manifesto data or
expert surveys. Secondly, they allow us to control for the effect
of contextual features, e.g., the saliency of specific issues at the
time of the investiture debate.
We built our ideological divergence variable in two steps.
Fig. 3. Agenda diversity and scope of government agendas.
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First, we computed the coalition’s ideological position by
averaging the positions of all governing partners. Two
operationalizations are possible here, reflecting different
understandings of agenda bargaining within a ruling coalition.
First, following veto players theory (Tsebelis 2002), we may
expect all partners to hold some veto power, regardless of their
size. Small extreme parties grant their support in exchange for a
voice in the coalition decision-making process. In this case, we
aggregate party positions by taking their simple mean. The
second possibility is that parties with a bigger representation in
parliament have a stronger leverage in coalition bargaining
(Strøm 1990). Should this be the prevalent dynamic, we weight
the mean of party positions by their share of parliamentary seats.
Secondly, for each pair of governing coalitions in our dataset,
we computed the difference in their ideological positions using
both their mean ideology (DISTANCE) and their mean weighted
ideology (DISTANCEW). We took the absolute value of the
difference, given that the expected net impact of an ideological
difference of -10 should equal that of an ideological difference
of 10.
Our model includes a set of control factors. GOVTYPE
classifies all of the cabinets according to four types of
government (minority governments, minimal winning coalitions,
surplus majorities and technocratic) and assigns a value of 1 if
both cabinets in the pair belong to the same category, or of 0
otherwise. We expect that, at the net of ideological differences,
different types of government (reflecting a different equilibrium
between the parties supporting the cabinet) employ different
processes of agenda formation, which leads to a different
fractionalization of the agenda. ENCP measures, for each pair of
cabinets, the difference in the effective number of parties in the
ruling coalition.15 Similarly to GOVTYPE, this variable captures
different agenda-formation conditions: coalitions with more
equally sized partners (a high ENCP) should display different
methods of interest aggregation than coalitions with a dominant
party (a low ENCP). Data on both GOVTYPE and ENCP were
15 This variable is defined as:
ENCP
where n is the number of coalition partners i and is the square of each
party’s proportion of coalition seats.
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retrieved from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2016).
The last cabinet-related variable – POST-ELECTION -
measures whether both governments in our pair are supported
by either electoral coalitions - the first in the legislature – or
parliamentary coalitions - any other coalition solution that has
emerged in parliament during the legislature after the cabinet is
voted down.
With regard to speech-specific variables, DIFF_LENGTH
controls for the rhetoric style of PMs by calculating the number
of (quasi-)sentences in each speech. As we show in Figure 1,
some PMs have a greater tendency to delve into the details of
policies than others. Finally, the variable DIFF_TIME controls
for the temporal distance between governments. We compute it
by ranking our 27 cabinets in time and by counting the number
of observations separating the cabinets in our pair.16 This
variable captures all of the factors (related to both the state of
the economy and general political conditions) that varied over
time.
Finally, to evaluate whether the advent of government
alternation has imposed different dynamics on the effect of
ideological distance on agenda divergence, we further added a
binary variable (REPUBLIC), taking the value of 1 if both
coalitions were in office during the Second Republic and 0 for
coalitions ruling in the First Republic. All of the pairs (n=182)
including coalitions from both periods were dropped.
16 For instance, the temporal distance between Prodi I (inaugurated in
1996, 53rd cabinet of the Italian Republic) and Berlusconi II (2001, 57th
cabinet) is 4.
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TABLE 1. Ordinary Least Squares regression of factors driving divergence












































































































Observations 300 300 300 146 146
R2 0.162 0.199 0.176 0.145 0.147











Notes: * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.
Table 1 lists the results of our standard multiple linear
regression models with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
We present five models: only including control variables (1);
with the addition of our two main covariates measuring
22 AUTORE / Argomento articolo /PREPRINT VERSION
government distance (2 and 3); and with the interaction
between these two covariates and REPUBLIC (4 and 5).
The results in models 2 and 3 largely support the partisan
differentiation hypothesis, positing that a government’s
ideological distance is correlated with the thematic divergence of
the policy agendas of executives, regardless of how it is
measured. The coefficients for DISTANCE and DISTANCEW
are positive and statistically significant. For each additional
change in government distance, divergence scores increase by an
average of 0.18 (model 2) and 0.13 (model 3). Ceteris paribus,
governments with different positions on the left-right dimension,
are more likely (on average) to present different agendas. This
finding supports previous scholarly works showing that being
represented in government grants parties the opportunity to pull
the ideological position of the government toward their ideal
point (e.g., Laver and Budge 1992; Curini and Ceron 2013). Not
only do the parties in government guide the policy preferences of
the cabinet along the Left-Right dimension, but also its policy
priorities.
As for our control variables, their both being electoral
governments (POST-ELECTION) is always statistically
associated with the degree of agenda convergence. The
relationship is negative, meaning that, all else being equal, the
agendas of electoral governments tend to converge. These results
are in line with what emerged from our descriptive analysis of
agenda evolution. The agendas of governments inaugurating a
legislature tend to be distinct from all of the others. Cabinets feel
entitled to build more ambitious and differentiated agendas
because of the longer time horizon. Another consistently
significant finding is the effect of DIFF_TIME. The further away
in time governments are from one another, the more their
agendas diverge. This finding is unsurprising but important,
because it allows us to take into account both relatively short-
term events (e.g., the Italian economic downturns in the early
90s and during the euro crisis affected the agenda of all of the
cabinets in office during the period) and long-term
transformations in economic and political contexts (e.g., it is not
too far-fetched to expect that both the end of the Cold War and
the deepening of European integration through subsequent
Treaty modifications had an impact on cabinet priorities).
We fit the last two models (4 and 5) by considering only
those pairs for which both cabinets belong to either the First or
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the Second Republic. This way, we test whether the effect of
government distance differs across the two periods. The
interaction of both our main ideology-based covariates with
REPUBLIC is significant at conventional levels with negative
coefficients. The latter tell us that the effect of ideological
distance in structuring the policy agenda of the PM’s speech gets
smaller during the Second Republic (REPUBLIC=1). We
demonstrate this effect graphically in Figure 4. The line
representing the predicted values of agenda divergence at
different levels of DISTANCE is flat for Second Republic
cabinets. For First Republic cabinets, it is positively rising.
We can only conjecture on the processes generating these
results. First, it may arise from the transformation in the process
of agenda formation across the two phases. Until the early 90s,
programmatic platforms were drafted after an election or a
government crisis with the primary purpose of holding together
the coalition. As a result, they had to faithfully reflect the new
political equilibrium among the coalition partners, even if
ideological differences from one government to another were
small. On the contrary, during the Second Republic, part of the
burden of programmatic negotiation within a coalition shifted to
the pre-electoral phase. Under these circumstances, the role
played by confidence speeches became relatively less important
in reflecting the priorities of coalition partners. Secondly, from a
temporal perspective, our finding seems to lend support to the
literature on the progressively fading distinction between left and
right in contemporary democracies (see Mair 2013). As time
goes by, exogenous determinants – like globalization and
capital mobility in financial markets, the general pressure of an
ageing population on welfare states and integration within the
European Union – should have increasing weight in the drafting
of executive agendas. On top of this, the parallel long-term
decline in party-based social constituencies (Mair 2005) makes
the incorporation of collective preferences in party policy
orientations increasingly difficult.
Fig. 4. Interaction effect of DISTANCE and REPUBLIC on AGENDA
DIVERGENCE.
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6
Conclusions
Does a government’s ideological position matter in terms of the
kinds of policy decisions it makes? We analysed this central
question in democratic theory from a different angle to what has
been explored in previous scholarly research on executive
agendas. More specifically, we tested whether partisan
ideological differences between governments are correlated with
the thematic divergence of their policy agendas. Whereas
previous studies failed to find much effect of partisanship, our
results demonstrate that ideologically distant cabinets tend to
prioritize policy issues differently when constructing their agenda.
These findings are interesting because they emerge from the
analysis of a typically multiparty coalition-based political
system where, due to the need for partners to compromise on
policy, one would expect the relationship between ideology and
agenda to be more difficult to observe than in a two party
system.17
The interpretation of these findings comes with a caveat.
Although we control for the time distance between cabinets, it is
arguable that measuring ideological differences on the left-right
17 On the other hand, comparative findings had already found weak
support for the argument that election mandates and partisan shifts are
stronger in majoritarian systems “than in multiparty coalition systems
where the governing parties need to show regard for the coalitional
partners.” (Mortensen et al. 2011, p. 6).
Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche / ?.200? 25
dimension is problematic when they are divided by decades. The
finding that the effect of ideology differs between the First and
Second Republic indicates that future research should look more
closely into the issue of time comparison.
A second contribution made by this article was that it
presented and explored a new dataset tracking the policy
content contained in the investiture speeches of Italian PMs from
1979 to 2014. These data showed that PM investiture speeches
have become progressively shorter and have devoted less space
to specific policy proposals. At the same time, a limited number
of issues have always remained at the core of programmatic
speeches - macroeconomics, justice and crime, foreign policy
and state operations - confirming comparative findings
(Jennings et al. 2011).
As it adopted a macro-perspective, this article only started to
scratch the surface of what is possible thanks to this new dataset.
The adoption of the CAP coding scheme, which is also used to
code the policy content of different policy documents in Italy
(i.e., party manifestos, laws, legislative decrees and
parliamentary questions) and several other countries, paves the
road for several lines of research. For instance, cabinet agendas
can be used either as a dependent variable - e.g., in studies
investigating government coalition formation or PM leadership
styles - or as an independent variable - e.g., when studying the
distribution of attention in government legislative initiatives.
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